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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44024 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CR 2015-12514 
v.     ) 
     ) 
MARTINA LEE SITTRE,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Martina Sittre appeals contending the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed her sentence in this case.  She asserts that a properly-focused consideration 
of the mitigating factors reveals that a more lenient underlying sentence would better 
serve the goals of sentencing for possession of methamphetamine in this case.  
However, the district court went beyond that proper focus by considering whether prior 
sentencing decisions against her were, in its opinion, appropriate because it concluded 
there were “virtually no consequences at all.  And that is disturbing to me.”  (Tr., p.18, 
Ls.21-23.)  As such, this Court should either reduce Ms. Sittre’s sentence as it deems 
appropriate or, alternatively, remand this case for a new sentencing determination. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Ms. Sittre, who was fifty-four years old at the time of sentencing (see PSI, p.2), 
has been dealing with depression and anxiety issues, including possible somatoform 
disorder.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.42.)  She endured a 
rough childhood, which included physical and sexual abuse by family members and 
foster care providers.  (PSI, pp.21-22.)  And yet, despite a significant history of 
misdemeanor convictions, this case only constitutes her second felony conviction.1  
(See PSI, pp.5-20.)  The PSI author noted that Ms. Sittre completed a term of 
supervised probation in 2008, and “has not been on supervised probation for several 
years.”  (PSI, p.31.)   
 In regard to the instant offense, Ms. Sittre explained she had been “partying” with 
a group of people who had been friends with her late cousin.  (PSI, p.31.)  That cousin 
had only recently passed away, and he and Ms. Sittre had been close.  (PSI, p.5.)  She 
explained that, during that party, one of the people had given her a pipe, which she had 
used to smoke methamphetamine.  (PSI, p.5; Tr., p.9, Ls.16-20.)  She indicated she left 
with the pipe, but had started to go back to return it when she encountered officers who 
found the pipe during a search after they arrested her.  (PSI, p.5; R., p.32.)  The officers 
had been dispatched to investigate a disturbance reported at the party and Ms. Sittre 
                                            
1 Ms. Sittre’s prior felony conviction was from 1993, and was for theft, not possession of 
a controlled substance.  (PSI, pp.11-12; cf. Tr., p.13, Ls.15-17 (defense counsel 
explaining it would be inappropriate to characterize Ms. Sittre as a habitual 
methamphetamine user, as this was her first felony possession of a controlled 
substance charge).)  As to her misdemeanor record, the district court counted sixty-four 
prior misdemeanor cases in Ms. Sittre’s history.  (Tr., p.17, Ls.21-25.)  However, ten of 
those cases were dismissed in their entirety and an eleventh provides no disposition 
either way.  (See PSI, pp.5-20.) 
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had been recognized as having an outstanding warrant, which was apparently the 
product of a failure to appear due to the fact that Ms. Sittre mistakenly believed her 
court date was a few days later. (See R., p.33; PSI, pp.3-5.)  She expressed remorse 
for her decisions.  (PSI, p.5.)   
 Accordingly, Ms. Sittre pleaded guilty to one charge of possession of a controlled 
substance.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.6, Ls.12-15.)  In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the 
Information, Part II, and to join the recommendation of the PSI, unless it recommended 
more than a period of retained jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.6-19.)  During her presentence 
incarceration, Ms. Sittre completed the SHARE program.  (Tr., p.16, Ls.15-18.)  The PSI 
author recommended Ms. Sittre be considered for probation, as that would allow her the 
opportunity to address her substance abuse and mental health issues in the community.  
(PSI, p.31.)  Both parties joined that recommendation.  (Tr., p.17, Ls.9-12, p.18, Ls.7-
10.)   
The district court, however, determined that the needed treatment could not be 
effectively achieved in the community, and so it retained jurisdiction so Ms. Sittre could 
participate in a rider program.  (Tr., p.19, Ls.3-12.)  The district court also expressed its 
concern that Ms. Sittre’s history had “one misdemeanor after another, and with virtually 
no consequences at all.  And that is disturbing to me.”  (Tr., p.18, Ls.21-23.)  As a 
result, it imposed an underlying unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed.2  
                                            
2 Ms. Sittre has filed a motion requesting the district court reconsider her sentence and 
grant leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b).  (R., p.127; see also R., p.122 (Ms. Sittre filing a 
pro se motion for leniency).)  That motion was filed timely from the judgment of 
conviction.  (See R., pp.114, 127.)  According to the online repository, a hearing on that 
motion scheduled for February 24, 2016, was continued, though the repository does not 
indicate the reason why. It appears Ms. Sittre’s Rule 35 motion is still pending.  
Accordingly, Ms. Sittre moved to suspend the briefing schedule in this case pending 
4 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.11-12.)  Ms. Sittre filed a notice of appeal timely from the Judgment of 




Whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed Ms. Sittre’s sentence. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Ms. Sittre’s Sentence 
 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest.  See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 
(Ct. App. 1982).  In order to show an abuse of the district court’s discretion in that 
regard, the defendant must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts.  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 
(1997).  The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:  (1) protection of society; 
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  Id.   
In this case, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed Ms. Sittre’s 
underlying sentence by going beyond the proper consideration of her criminal history.  
                                                                                                                                            
resolution of her Rule 35 motion.  (Motion to suspend Briefing Schedule, filed July 19, 
2016.)  However, the Idaho Supreme Court denied her motion to suspend.  (Order 
Denying Motion to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, entered August 2, 2016.)  As a 
result, any issues in regard to the Rule 35 motion will be addressed if and when 
Ms. Sittre files a notice of appeal from the order on her motion. 
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(See Tr., p.18, Ls.22-23.)  Certainly, a sentencing court is allowed to consider the 
defendant’s criminal history when imposing a sentence.  See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 
133 Idaho 228, 229 (Ct. App. 1999).  However, its discretion in that regard is not 
limitless.  Id.  For example, the district court does not have discretion to use the new 
sentence to redress perceived shortcomings in a sentence imposed in a prior case.  Id. 
at 229-230; see also Flores v. Lodge, 101 Idaho 533, 534 (1980) (holding that, in a 
habeas proceeding, it would be improper for the judgment of a Fourth District Court to 
be substituted for the proper judgment imposed by a Third District Court).  The district 
court’s statements, like those in Findeisen, reflect that the district court went beyond 
permissible consideration of Ms. Sittre’s criminal history and addressed whether the 
prior punishments were, in its opinion, appropriate.  (See Tr., p.18, Ls.22-23 
(considering the apparent lack of consequences, which the district court concluded was, 
in its opinion, “disturbing”).)  As such, the record reveals an abuse of the district court’s 
discretion. 
A properly-focused consideration of the factors in the record demonstrates a 
more lenient sentence would better serve all the goals of sentencing.  For example, 
although Ms. Sittre does have a significant history of misdemeanor convictions, this still 
only constitutes her second felony conviction, and her first for possession of a controlled 
substance, in her fifty-four years.  (See PSI, pp.2, 5-20; Tr., p.13, Ls.15-17.)  It is also 
noteworthy that her only other felony conviction is nearly thirteen years behind her.  
(See PSI, pp.11-12.)  And, in regard to her more recent convictions, the PSI author 
pointed out that Ms. Sittre successfully completed supervised probation in 2008 and has 
not had to be returned to that level of supervision in recent years.  (PSI, p.31.)  She also 
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completed the SHARE program during her presentencing incarceration.  (See Tr., p.16, 
Ls.15-18.)   
Therefore, a proper consideration of the relevant factors shows Ms. Sittre can be 
successful in treatment programs, and so, there is less of a need to provide a hedge 
against uncertainty of her performance during the rider program.  Compare State v. 
Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting the common practice to impose 
longer underlying sentences in light of judicial uncertainty as to the defendant’s ability to 
complete a rider program).   As such, a proper consideration of Ms. Sittre’s entire 
history indicates the sentence, particularly the length of the underlying term of 




Ms. Sittre respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 31st day of August, 2016. 
 
      /s/_________________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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